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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The devastating consequences of the 2008 financial crisis on economic activity and 
unemployment have reignited the debate on the causes of financial fragility and 
instability. Empirically, a thorough overview of the events preceding and accompanying 
the current financial crisis is provided in Allen and Carletti (2010), 
Brunnermeier (2009), Greenlaw et al. (2008) and Taylor (2009). The financial crisis is 
attributed to a number of factors associated with the housing and credit markets. 
Suggested causes include the inability of homeowners to make their mortgage 
payments, overbuilding during the boom period, high personal and corporate debt 
levels, financial product innovation, the failure of key financial institutions and errors of 
judgment by credit rating agencies in the rating of structured products. Macroeconomic 
factors such as accommodating monetary policy, global imbalances and government 
regulation (or lack thereof) are also considered to have played a direct or indirect role in 
the crisis (Cabral, 2013). 
Another important factor underlined is the significant increase in banks’ leverage levels 
in the 4-5 years preceding the crisis of the summer of 2007 and the panic of the autumn 
of 2008, in particular for the major European banks and for US investment banks. The 
increase in bank leverage was around 50% in some cases. The levels of asset-to-equity 
ratios (or equity multiplier) remained quite close to a range of 20-25, i.e. capital-asset 
ratios (or leverage ratios) of 5% to 4%, until 2003-2004, with significant differences 
according to regions or categories of banks.1 Between 2005 and the crisis, the top 50 
major global banks, of the US investment banks and European universal banks, had an 
equity multiplier close to or even exceeding 30, and therefore a leverage ratio of only 
3% (Financial Stability Forum and Committee on the Global Financial System Joint 
Working Group (2009)). 
This excess leverage prior to the crisis and the devastating impact of deleveraging in its 
wake explain why the G20 and all the supervisors were converted to the idea that a 
leverage ratio should be added to the traditional prudential measures. This would be 
complementary to prudential risk ratios, and consequently not replace Basel II or Basel 
III micro-prudential regulation under preparation. This leverage ratio is a measure of a 
bank’s Tier 1 capital as a percentage of its assets plus off-balance sheet exposures and 
derivatives. The Basel Committee has chosen a minimum leverage ratio of 3%, and thus 
a maximum equity multiplier of 33. The implementation of this ratio on an experimental 
basis is set to begin in January 2013, and after various adjustment phases between 2015 
and 2017, this ratio will become imperative, in Pillar I of Basel III, in January 2018 
(BIS Annual Report, 2011). 
                                                 
 
1 In this paper, we will always use the term "equity multiplier" to characterise the "asset-to-equity ratio" 
and the term "leverage ratio" to refer to the "capital-asset ratio". 
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However, the question of the efficiency of such a regulatory leverage ratio is open to 
debate. If the chosen value of the ratio is too low, it will have a detrimental impact on 
banks' ability to make loans. On the contrary, if the chosen value of the ratio is too high, 
it will not prevent banks' excess risk taking. In both cases, the question of an existing 
value of leverage ratio that minimizes banks' financial fragility2 and its link with credit 
availability must be addressed. This is the main objective of this paper. 
 
Our contribution is related to the literature on bank leverage and financial fragility. A 
major author dealing with this question is Minsky (1982, 1986) who developed a 
business cycle theory based on a financial conception of economic fluctuations and 
more specifically the “financial instability hypothesis”. In Minsky’s approach, banks' 
profit-seeking behaviour leads them to deliberately reduce their capital-asset ratio and 
engage in financial operations involving high leverage when their activity is expanding. 
As underlined by contemporary economists such as Goodhart (2010) or Roubini and 
Mihm (2010), the recent financial crisis is largely based on similar mechanisms. More 
recently, several economists have assigned great importance to debt leverage in the 
dynamics of financial instability. J. Geanakoplos (2010a, 2010b) postulates a leverage 
cycle, seen as a recurrent phenomenon in US financial history. In a series of articles on 
the subprime crisis, T. Adrian and H. S. Shin (2010a, 2010b) examine the role of 
financial intermediation in the financial crisis of 2007-2009, and at the same time the 
role of leverage effects. They emphasize the pro-cyclicality of leverage and the positive 
relationship between leverage and the size of financial intermediaries’ balance sheets, 
especially before the crisis. In the same vein, H.S. Shin (2009) models a lending boom 
fuelled by declines in measured risk. He shows that in benign financial market 
conditions when measured risks are low, financial intermediaries expand their balance 
sheets as they increase leverage. There is, of course, a symmetrical process that 
accentuates the magnitude of the crisis when the measured risks are high, leading to 
sharp deleveraging, then resulting in a credit crunch. 
Following this growing literature, we develop a model that shows that financial fragility 
can result from banks’ optimal profit maximisation decisions even if they meet the 
micro-prudential requirements laid down by the Basel II accord. However, in addition to 
the previous literature, our model allows us to address the question of an "optimal" 
leverage ratio that minimises financial fragility. 
The question for the need of such a leverage ratio restriction was already studied by the 
literature. In a seminal paper, Blum (2008) shows that in a Basel II framework, banks 
can report their level of risk untruthfully. In this context, a risk-independent leverage 
ratio restriction may be necessary to induce truthful risk reporting. However, Blum does 
not propose to evaluate the value of such a ratio. More recently, Jarrow (2013) tries to 
                                                 
 
2 We define bank fragility as the critical level of macroeconomic shock at which a bank goes bankrupt. 
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provide a rational for determining the value of a maximal leverage ratio based on a VaR 
rules. In his paper, this value depends on banks' microeconomics characteristics and 
especially on the structure of banks' balance sheet. Our approach differs from the one of 
Jarrow (2013) since in our model, the optimal value of a leverage ratio depends also on 
the macroeconomics condition and is not only linked we the specific characteristics of 
one bank. Two main results are obtained from our analysis. 
First, we show that there is a non-linear relationship between the level of bank leverage 
and financial fragility defined as the critical level of macroeconomic shock at which a 
bank goes bankrupt. More precisely, there is an optimal value of leverage minimising 
financial fragility which allows us to identify two states called respectively the 
"inefficient equilibrium state" and the "trade-off equilibrium state". In the inefficient 
equilibrium state, high levels of financial fragility are associated with low bank leverage 
and low levels of credit availability. On the contrary, in the trade-off equilibrium state, 
high levels of financial fragility are associated with high bank leverage and high levels 
of credit availability. This result allows us to stress that bank leverage may increase 
without being detrimental to financial instability as long as the level of leverage chosen 
by the banks is lower than the one that minimises financial fragility. This result is useful 
also in order to understand the potential impact of the new Basel III capital regulation 
that introduces a maximum value for bank leverage. Actually, if the maximum value 
fixed by the regulatory authorities is too low, the economy can be trapped in the 
inefficient equilibrium state, whereas excessively high maximum leverage stimulates 
credit availability to the detriment of financial stability. 
Second, we show that the equilibrium level of leverage chosen by the bank and the 
value of leverage that minimises financial fragility both depend on the overall economic 
situation and on the value of the collateral provided by firms to the bank. We 
accordingly show that there is a critical threshold above which an increase in the 
expected value of collateral leads to an increase in financial fragility. We link such a 
result to the increase in financial fragility due to a rise in assets prices. This result is in 
accordance with the literature that explicitly links bank behaviour, endogenous debt 
growth and financial instability. Compared to this literature, the originality of our 
analysis is to show that even in an "ideal" economic environment (perfect information, 
economic expansion, optimistic expectations, rising assets prices, rational agents within 
the standard meaning of the term), a pro-cyclical financial fragility process based on the 
relationship between assets prices and the bank lending cycle may develop. As a result, 
since the optimal level of leverage minimising financial fragility depends on the overall 
business climate, we advocate the establishment of an adjustable leverage ratio, 
depending on economic conditions, rather than the fixed ratio provided for under Basel 
III. 
   
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the model, while 
Sections 3 and 4 show and discuss our main results. Section 5 concludes. 
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2. THE MODEL 
 
We consider three classes of agents – firms, individual investors and a bank – and two 
periods. In the first period, firms need external funds in order to invest in a risky project 
subject to a macroeconomic shock. We assume that firms have access to bank loans 
only. In this period, financial contracts are signed between lenders and the bank and 
investment decisions are made. In the second period, the value of the macroeconomic 
shock and the effective return on investment are known. Non-defaulting firms have to 
pay for their external funds whereas defaulting firms are liquidated. We assume that all 
parties are risk-neutral and protected by limited liability. 
 
 
2.1. Firms and bank behaviours 
 
Firms have access to a risky investment project that requires one unit of wealth in order 
to be undertaken in period 1. There is no financial market and firms lack capital and 
need to borrow the total amount of their investment from a bank. 
 
In period 2, the total return on investment projects ( )iV  undertaken by firms i  (we 
assimilate a firm with its project) depends on two parameters. The first one is a specific 
factor ix , related to firms’ specific characteristics. We assume that ix  is uniformly 
distributed over [ ]0,1  and known at the beginning of period 1 by firms and by the bank. 
The second is a macroeconomic shock q  which is similar to systematic risk for 
projects. Thus, the total return on project i  at period 2 is given by i iV xq= . 
 
We adopt dzq q= +  with 1q >  and dz dtqes=  a Brownian motion. qs  is a 
measure of the volatility of the shock, ( )0,1Ne   is a normally distributed stochastic 
variable and 1dt =  (the length of the period). Consequently, the value of the shock in 
period 2 is equal to qq q es= +  and depends only on the realisation of the stochastic 
variable e . As [ ] 0eE = , the expected value of the macroeconomic shock in period 1 is 
given by [ ]q qE = . 
 
Lastly, we assume that firms must provide an asset as collateral for their loan, with eZ  
being the expected value of this collateral at period 1. eZ  is supposed to be the same for 
all firms with ] [0,1eZ Î . 
 
There is one bank in the economy endowed with its own capital and individual 
investors’ deposits. These deposits are insured through a government-funded scheme 
and receive the risk-free return 1g >  (which is also the opportunity cost of the funds 
for the bank). The bank is owned by shareholders who provide it with the equity capital 
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required by banking regulations. At the beginning of period 1, the bank decides to 
finance the various investment projects proposed by firms at a return R g> . There is 
no moral hazard between the bank and firms as the value of ix  is common knowledge at 
period 1 and the realisation of iV  is freely observable by the bank at period 2. 
 
Finally, we assume that all firms apply for credit in period 1 and that the bank finances 
them as long as the expected value of their projects exceeds the rate of return they must 
pay back in period 2, such that 
 [ ]i iE V x Rq= ³  (1) 
From equation (1) it is easy to show that the last firm financed by the bank is given by 
 ( )i Rx R q=  (2) 
and the total quantity of financing in the economy is given by 
 ( )( )1 iD x R= -  with Rq >  (3) 
 
2.2. Bank regulatory capital and firms’ probability of default 
 
We assume that the bank’s level of capital is exactly equal to that required by the Basel 
II Advanced IRB approach.3 According to Basel II, the level of a bank’s capital 
requirements is linked to the level of risk of its loan portfolio. In order to calculate the 
bank’s capital requirements, we need to calculate the probability of default of each 
project (or equivalently firm) it finances. 
 
A project i  is in default if the firm cannot repay the value R  in period 2. Formally, the 
probability of default of each project is given by the following conditional probability 
 ( )i i iV R x x Ré ùR < ³ê úë û  (4) 
As i i i iV x x x qq q es= = +  we obtain 
 ( )i i i ix x R x x Rqq esé ùR + < ³ê úë û  and 
 ( ) ( )( )ii i i i i
i
R x
x x R p R
x q
qe e f es
é ù-ê úR < = ³ = =ê úê úë û
 (5) 
where f  denotes the cumulative distribution function of a standard normal random 
variable. This equation means that project i  defaults if the realised value of the shock e  
                                                 
 
3 This assumption does not change the main results of the paper and can be justified by the fact that 
capital is more costly than deposits. 
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is larger than the critical value ie , with 0ie £  since iR xq£ . This probability of 
default is an increasing function of the rate of return ( )R  charged by the bank, and of 
the volatility of the shock, qs . Conversely, this probability of default decreases in line 
with the value of ix  i.e. the intrinsic “quality” of project i . 
 
According to the Basel II Advanced IRB approach, the level of a bank’s capital 
requirements depends on the level of risk of its loan portfolio. Using the usual single-
factor risk model adopted by the IRB approach allows us to define the conditional credit 
default rate ( ),i iP a e  as 
 ( ) ( ) ( )( )
1 1
,
1
i
i i
p
P
f r f aa e f r
- -é ù+ê ú= ê ú-ê úë û
 (6) 
 
According to equation (6), there is an a  chance that the default rate on the loan i  will 
be less than ( ),i iP a e . We use a measure of r  and a  similar to that adopted by the IRB 
approach with 0.999a=  and ( )( )
1 exp 50
0.24 0.12
1 exp 50
ipr é ù- -ê ú= - ê ú- -ë û
. 
 
( )1 i ipf e- = , ( )1 af a e- =  and equation (6) becomes 
 ( ) ( ), 1
i
i iP
ae r ea e f r
é ù+ê ú= ê ú-ê úë û
 (7) 
In order to compute the regulatory capital requirements, we need the Exposure at 
Default (EAD) and the Loss Given Default (LGD) of the bank. In our model, EAD is 
equal to 1 (the amount of the loan) while we assume that the LGD is given by ( )eZl  
with ( ) 0
e
e
Z
Z
l¶ <¶  and  ( )1lim 0e
e
Z
Zl

= . These assumptions are in accordance with the 
Advanced IRB approach where the LGD is chosen by the bank according to its internal 
model and the estimated value of the debt recovery rate (positively correlated with the 
expected value of the collateral). Consequently, Basel II bank capital requirements for 
project i  are given by the following formula:4 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( )( ),ei i i ik R Z P pl a e= -  (8) 
Consequently, the total amount of the bank’s capital (the value of its Economic Capital) 
is equal to the regulatory capital required in order to cover its loan portfolio: 
                                                 
 
4 We do not take maturity adjustments into consideration. 
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 ( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )( )
( )
1 1
,
i i
e
i i i i i i
x R x R
K R k R dx Z P p dxl a e= = -ò ò  
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( )
1
,
i
e
i i i i
x R
K R Z P dxl a e f e= -ò  (9) 
 
3. EQUILIBRIUM AND FINANCIAL STABILITY 
 
We have defined the equilibrium of the economy as the value of the rate of return that 
maximises the bank’s Risk Adjusted Return on Capital (RAROC). This equilibrium 
value of the rate of return is associated with a certain bank leverage level and a given 
level of financing. 
 
3.1. Bank's equilibrium and the total value of financing 
 
The expected profit of the bank depends on the number of projects it finances and the 
number of defaulting loans. When the bank finances a project, it expects to receive the 
rate of return R  if the project succeeds and the expected value of the collateral eZ  if the 
project fails.5 Project i ’s probability of default is given by ( )if e  and its probability of 
success is given by ( )1 if e- . Moreover, we know that the last project financed by the 
bank is ( )ix R  and that the cost of deposit for the bank (opportunity cost of the funds) is 
given by 1g > . The expected profit of the bank at period 1, net of the opportunity cost 
of the funds, is equal to 
( ) ( )( ) ( )
( )
( )( )
( )
1 1
1 1
i i
e e
b i i i i i
x R x R
R R Z dx k R dxf e f e gé ù é ùP = - + - -ê ú ë ûë ûò ò  
( ) ( )( ) ( )
( )
( )
( )
1 1
1
i i
e e
b i i i i i
x R x R
R R Z dx k R dxf e f e g gé ùP = - + - +ê úë ûò ò  or using (9) 
 ( ) ( )( ) ( )
( )
( )
1
1
i
e e
b i i i
x R
R R Z dx K Rf e f e g gé ùP = - + - +ê úë ûò  (10) 
 
We assume that the bank seeks to maximise its net expected RAROC. The gross 
expected RAROC is defined by 
                                                 
 
5 We assume the project has no residual value in the event of default. 
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 Expected profit of the bankRAROC
Economic Capitalb
R= =  
 
Using (9) and (10), the value of the gross expected RAROC is equal to 
 ( )( )
( )( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( )
1
1
1
,
i
i
e
i i i
e
x Rb
b
e
i i i i
x R
R Z dx
R
R
K R
Z P dx
f e f e g
g
l a e f e
é ù- + -ê úë ûP= = +
-
ò
ò
 (11) 
 
and the net expected RAROC is equal to 
 
( ) ( )
( )( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( )
1
1
1
,
i
i
e
i i i
x R
b
e
i i i i
x R
R Z dx
R R
Z P dx
f e f e g
g
l a e f e
é ù- + -ê úë û
G º - =
-
ò
ò
 (12) 
 
PROPOSITION 1. 
a. For ( )
5
2 e
e
Z
Z
qgsg q g- < < - , there is a unique value 
* ,cR R qù éÎ û ë  with cR g>  that 
maximises the net RAROC of the bank and ( )* 0RG > . 
 
b. The total level of financing in the economy is given by ( ) ( )( )* * *1 0iD R x R= - >  
with  ( ) 0,D R R
R
¶ < "¶  and the equilibrium level of the bank’s leverage (or equity 
multiplier) is equal to ( ) ( )( )
* *
* *
* *
D R
R
K R
=  with ( ) 0,R R
R
¶ < "¶
 . 
 
Proof of Proposition 1: see Appendix. 
 
According to part a of proposition 1, the bank can always find a unique value of the rate 
of return it charges to firms that maximises its net expected RAROC. Moreover, as 
stated in part b of proposition 1, the total quantity of financing in the economy is a 
decreasing function of the rate of return charged by the bank, since when the bank’s rate 
of return on loans falls, some new firms find it profitable to apply for credit. Finally, the 
level of bank leverage is a decreasing function of the rate of return it charges to firms. 
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This result can be easily understood as firms are financed partly by bank capital and 
partly by deposits. Thus, when the bank cuts the rate of return it charges to firms, its 
level of assets increases (since the amount of loans financed increases) at a faster pace 
than its level of regulatory capital, leading to a rise in its equilibrium level of leverage. 
 
3.2. Bank leverage and financial fragility 
 
We now consider the value of the macroeconomic shock that leads the bank to default. 
We assume that the bank goes bankrupt when its value at period 2 is lower than the 
level of capital required by the regulations. In that case, the bank can be shut down by 
the regulatory authorities. This view is similar to the one proposed by Heid (2007). 6 
 
The value of the bank at period 2 comprises two parts. The first part is the capital 
endowment that allows the bank to absorb part of the macroeconomic shock, while the 
second part is determined by the value of the bank’s assets. Bank capital consists of 
regulatory capital only. The value of the bank's assets is linked to the realised value of 
the macroeconomic shock and the realised value of the collateral Z . We assume, in line 
with empirical literature on this question, that the realised value of the collateral is 
constant at a level Z  in line with the historical debt recovery rate on investment 
projects.7 Thus, the value of the bank at period 2 essentially depends on the realisation 
of the macroeconomic shock. 
 
0ce <  is defined as the value of the macroeconomic shock for which firms with 
i i c
c
R
x x x
qq s e
< £ = +  are in default. This means that financed firms with 
] ],1i cx xÎ  are successful whereas financed firms with [ ],i i cx x xÎ  are in default. The 
equilibrium value of the bank at period 2 is given by 
 ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( )
( )
1 1c
c i i
x R
b i i i
x R x R x R
V R K R Rdx Zdx dxg= + + -ò ò ò  (13) 
 
Or equivalently with ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( )
1
,
i
i i i i
x R
K R Z P dxl a e f e= -ò , 
( ) ( ),c i
c
R R
x R x R
qq e s q
= =+
                                                 
 
6 Heid (2007) pp. 3888-3889. 
7 Moody's or S&P's evaluations of the mean debt recovery rate, for instance.  
11 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( )
( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ] ( )[ ]
1
, 1 1
i
b i i i i c c i i
x R
V R Z P dx R x R Z x R x R x Rl a e f e g= - + - + - - -ò
 
Consequently, the bank goes bankrupt when 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( )
1
,
i
b i i i i
x R
V R K R Z P dxl a e f e= = -ò  or 
 ( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ] ( )[ ]1 1 0c c i iR x R Z x R x R x Rg- + - - - =  
 
PROPOSITION 2. 
a. When 0ce e£ <  with 
( )( )
( ) ( )c
R R
R Z R
q g qe s g q g
é ù- -ê úë ûº é ù- + -ê úë û
 the bank goes bankrupt. 
 
b. There is a value minR  of the rate of return associated with a value of bank leverage 
( )minR  that minimises the bank’s probability of default. 
 
Proof of Proposition 2: see Appendix. 
 
The value ce  can be considered as a measure of the financial fragility of the economy, 
as it defines the critical level of the macroeconomic shock for which the bank goes 
bankrupt. A rise in ce  means that the bank is more sensitive to a shock in the sense that 
the value of the shock that is required to make it fail is lower: financial fragility 
increases. In our model, the degree of financial fragility depends on the overall business 
climate, namely the maximum level of return on financed projects ( )q , the risk-free 
interest rate ( )g  and the rate of return charged by the bank ( )R .  
 
It is important to note that there is a nonlinear relationship between financial fragility 
and the rate of return charged by the bank. In order to understand this result, let us first 
assume that the rate of return charged by the bank is high. This means that the value of 
leverage and the total quantity of financing are low. Let us now assume that the bank 
decides to cut the value of the rate of return it charges to firms. Two mechanisms take 
place. First, firms’ ex ante probability of default falls with the rate of return charged by 
the bank. This first mechanism positively affects bank financial stability. Second, as the 
rate of return charged by the bank decreases, more firms are financed and the bank’s 
regulatory capital increases with the quantity of financing. Nevertheless, as firms are 
financed partly by bank capital and partly by deposits, the value of leverage increases 
(see part b of proposition 1). As the leverage increases, the ex post value of the bank 
depends more and more on the value of its assets. This second mechanism negatively 
affects the bank’s financial stability as the ex post value of the bank’s assets are related 
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to the level of the macroeconomic shock. Consequently, there is a critical value of the 
rate of return charged by the bank beyond which the second effect outweighs the first 
effect and the bank becomes more sensitive to the value of the macroeconomic shock. 
This critical value of the rate of return charged by the bank is associated with a critical 
value of leverage for which financial fragility increases in line with the leverage. 
 
( )minR  is thus defined as the “maximum stability value of leverage” which means the 
value of the equity multiplier for which the bank’s probability of default is at its 
minimum, and financial stability is at its maximum. Nevertheless, there is no reason for 
the bank to choose this specific value. On the contrary, we have shown that the 
equilibrium level of leverage chosen by the bank is the one that maximises its net 
RAROC, ( )*R . Consequently, two situations are possible. In the first case, 
( ) ( )* minR R<   and the equilibrium value of leverage chosen by the bank is lower 
than the "maximum stability value". This situation is "inefficient" from the point of 
view of the economy as a whole, since it is possible to increase the quantity of financing 
and financial stability simultaneously. In fact, a lower rate of return charged by the bank 
will increase the quantity of funds available to firms. Simultaneously, this increase in 
the quantity of financing will lead to an increase in the level of bank leverage and a 
decrease in the bank's probability of default. In the second case, ( ) ( )* minR R>   and 
the equilibrium value of leverage is higher than the "maximum stability value". In that 
case, there is a trade-off between financial stability and credit availability, as a higher 
degree of financial fragility must be accepted in order to increase the quantity of credit 
available to firms above ( )minR .8 
 
In Figure 1, we give a graphical representation of this mechanism. The right quadrant 
describes the relationship between the rate of return charged by the bank and the value 
of bank leverage ( )R . This relationship is decreasing, as a decline in the rate of return 
charged by the bank leads to a rise in leverage. The left quadrant links the value of the 
bank’s leverage to its probability of default ( )( )cf e , which is related to the critical 
value of the macroeconomic shock ce . 
 
As the rate of return charged by the bank decreases, the quantity of funds available to 
firms increases and more projects can be undertaken. Simultaneously, this increase in 
the quantity of financing leads to a rise in the level of bank leverage and a decrease in 
the probability of default as long as ( ) ( )minR R<  . When the level of bank leverage 
becomes higher than ( )minR , the bank’s probability of default increases in line with 
                                                 
 
8 This result is in line with the one of Inderst and Mueller (2008) who show that leverage is beneficial, at 
least up to certain point, in order to give banks incentives to make new risky loans. 
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the level of financing. Consequently, from that point, higher credit availability is 
possible if one accepts a higher level of financial instability. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Bank leverage and financial stability 
 
4. RISE IN ASSETS PRICES, FINANCIAL STABILITY AND 
MACROPRUDENTIAL REGULATION 
 
It is clear that the equilibrium rate of return charged by the bank depends on the overall 
state of the economy. Below, we study the impact of a change in the expected value of 
the collateral on bank behaviour and financial stability. We show there is a critical value 
of the collateral for which financial fragility increases with a rise in assets prices. This 
means that the equilibrium value of leverage chosen by the bank becomes higher than 
"the maximum stability value" and continues to diverge with the bubble. We therefore 
estimate "the maximum stability value of leverage" for given parameter values. By this 
heuristic experiment we show that this "maximum stability value" is not fixed but 
depends on the overall business climate. 
 
 
Inefficient area Trade-off 
area
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4.1. Asset prices and financial stability 
 
We model an rise in assets prices as an increase in the expected value of the collateral 
eZ . It is possible to show that this increase has a positive impact on the total level of 
financing and the equilibrium leverage value chosen by the bank. 
 
PROPOSITION 3 
 
a. ( )*R  is an increasing function of the expected value of the collateral eZ . 
b. There is a critical value ecZ  for which ( ) ( )* minR R>   and financial fragility 
increases along with the rise in the value of the collateral. 
 
Proof of proposition 3: see Appendix. 
 
Proposition 3 can be easily understood. The increase in the value of the collateral has a 
direct positive impact on the bank’s net expected profit since, ceteris paribus, it 
increases the expected return in the event of a firm’s default. Note also that a change in 
the expected value of the collateral directly alters the required level of regulatory capital 
(which decreases), since it depends on the LGD value estimated by the bank. 
Consequently, there is a kind of "freeing" amount of regulatory capital compared to the 
previous situation and the bank must change its behaviour in order to reach a new 
equilibrium. Actually, because of the "freeing" level of capital and the increase in the 
net expected profit for each loan that is financed, the bank is inclined to increase its 
level of financing. This can be done by cutting the rate of return charged on each loan. 
In this case, the quantity of funds provided to firms increases and the ex ante probability 
of default of each project falls as the rate of return charged to each firm decreases. At 
the same time, as the quantity of financing increases, the required level of regulatory 
capital increases. This process will stop as soon as the bank has restored the equilibrium 
value of its RAROC. Lastly, the equilibrium level of leverage increases in line with the 
quantity of financing (see proposition 1). 
 
As the equilibrium value of leverage chosen by the bank increases with the rise in the 
value of collateral, there is a critical expected value of the collateral for which the 
bank’s effective leverage becomes higher than the “maximum stability value of 
leverage” (part b of proposition 3). This means that financial fragility increases with the 
rise in assets prices as the bank becomes more and more sensitive to macroeconomic 
shocks. However, because of the structure of the model, it is impossible to formally 
obtain this critical expected value of the collateral. Thus, in the last part of the paper, we 
give a numerical illustration of proposition 3. This illustration is purely heuristic in the 
sense that we do not consider it as a prescriptive tool but as a way of stressing that both 
the “maximum stability value of leverage” and the critical expected value of the 
15 
 
collateral above which financial fragility increases depend on the overall business 
climate. 
 
4.2. A numerical illustration  
 
We have already underlined that the Basel Committee has chosen a minimum leverage 
ratio of 3%, and thus a maximum equity multiplier of 33. These values seem to be 
consistent with historical average in non-crisis periods but they are not based on a 
specific economic reasoning (Jarrow, 2013). In this part of the paper, we provide a 
numerical illustration of proposition 3 in order to show that for some plausible values of 
the various parameters of the model, “maximum stability value of leverage” is far from 
33. 
Table 1 gives the parameters values adopted for the simulation, while Figure 2 gives a 
graphical representation of the "maximum stability value" and the effective levels of 
leverage retains by the bank. 
 
Table 1. Values of the parameters 
 
We retain a debt recovery rate ( )Z  of 65% which is compatible with the mean recovery 
rate observed during financial crisis in Moody's or S&P's reports. We choose a riskless 
interest rate ( )g  of 1.5% which is near of the average rate of refinancing fixed by 
centrals banks between 2002 and 2005. Finally, the volatility of the macroeconomic 
shock ( )s  and the maximum rate of return on financed projects ( )q  are chosen in order 
to be compatible with a "good business climate" (5.5% and 45% respectively). 
 
Figure 2 gives a numerical illustration of proposition 3 for the values of Table 1. The 
“maximum stability value of leverage” ( )( )minR  is equal to 23.76 and corresponds to 
the horizontal line in Figure 2. It is far below the maximum equity multiplier of 33 fixed 
by Basel III prudential regulation (red line on Figure 2). 
 
The increasing function represents the various equilibrium values of leverage chosen by 
the bank ( )( )*R  according to the expected value of the collateral for the following 
range: [ ]0.55;0.75eZ Î .9 
 
                                                 
 
9 Simulations are done using Mathematica. Program is available on demand. 
q  s  g Z  
1.45 0.055 1.015 0.65 
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As expected, the equilibrium level of leverage that is chosen by the bank increases with 
the rise in the value of the collateral. 
Figure 2 gives also a graphical illustration of the area of financial fragility of the 
economy. This area of financial fragility is defined as the equilibrium situations where 
the level of leverage chosen by the bank (the one that maximize its profits) is higher 
than the “maximum stability value of leverage”. This area is bounded by the critical 
expected value of the collateral which is equal, in this case, to 0.7. 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Level of leverage and area of financial fragility 
 
This result highlights that the choice of a fixed regulatory level for the leverage ratio 
may be misleading if the objective is to reinforce financial stability. Under specific 
macroeconomic conditions (business climate) a bank may choose a level of leverage 
lower that the one fixed by the new regulation but higher than the “maximum stability 
value of leverage”. In that case, financial stability is not guaranteed by the fulfilment of 
the new leverage ratio. 
 
5. CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
 
In this paper, we have shown that financial fragility may emerge even though it is 
assumed that banks make rational decisions under perfect information. Our results are 
twofold. First, we show that risk-sensitive microprudential regulation, such as Basel II, 
cannot prevent an increase in financial fragility due to bank behaviour. In periods of 
0.65 0.7 0.75 0.8
20
25
30
35
40
( )*R  
( )minR  
eZ
e
cZ  
Leverage 
Maximum equity 
multiplier of 33 
Area of financial fragility
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expansion, characterised by a rise in assets prices, optimal bank behaviour leads to an 
increase in leverage that heightens financial fragility. Consequently, a maximum 
leverage ratio constraint seems justified in order to prevent financial fragility. This is the 
path followed by the new Basel III macroprudential regulations that aim to impose a 
maximum bank leverage of 33. However, our second result highlights the fact that the 
value of leverage that maximises financial stability is not constant along the cycle. This 
means that the regulator should adjust the leverage ratio in order to be efficient. This 
result is in line with the set of Basel III regulatory innovations which includes 
countercyclical capital ratios leading to stricter capital requirements during boom 
periods, in order to restrict the supply of loans (Arnold and Alii, 2012). 
 
In Basel III, these countercyclical provisions must be calibrated not according to the 
specific exposure of each financial institution, but in response to the total exposure 
relating to the stage in the economic cycle. Rather than resorting to totally discretionary 
devices, as might be the case through an enriched Pillar 2 within Basel II, or, 
conversely, adopting automatic rules, the option chosen by the Basel Committee is to 
define guidelines, or targets (for instance the value of total loans on GDP), which if 
exceeded may justify a gradual increase in the capital requirements of Pillar 1. Since our 
model showed that the value of leverage that maximises financial stability is not 
constant within the cycle, we advocate for a similar approach based on targets to define 
an adjustable leverage ratio. Our results advocate for targets based on the level of the 
riskless interest rate, assets prices and macroeconomic volatility.  
 
There are a number of directions in which our analysis can be extended but one stands 
out. Literature relative to risk-taking channel underlines that monetary policy affects 
risk-taking by banks because of the relationship between the level of short-term interest 
rates and the level of banking risks. This risk-taking channel seems to have played a 
major role in the run-up to the financial crisis. Empirically, even though the relationship 
is far from homogeneous, depending on the bank and the level of its capital, credit 
quality changes during the cycle and according to short-term rates. Thus, there is clearly 
a negative relationship between the interest rates set by monetary authorities and risk 
taking by banks, measured in different ways (spreads, banks' internal ratings). Low 
interest rates not only encourage the quantitative expansion of credit but also reduce its 
inherent quality in terms of risk. 
 
These results are highlighted by the fact that, as we have stressed in this article, it seems 
impossible to determine the optimal value of the leverage ratio independently of the 
business climate and consequently of the short-term interest rates. This will require, at 
the very least, extensive coordination between central banks and supervisory authorities 
if they remain separate, wherever they are. Much still has to be done to redefine a new 
central banking system aiming to ensure both monetary stability and financial stability. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Preliminary 
 
Remember that 
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Note that ( )K R  and ( )B R  are continuous and differentiable on ,R g qé ùÎ ë û . 
 
We know that for ( ) ( )
( )
( )
,
u R
w R
R F R f R x dx = ò  we have 
( ) ( )
( )
( )
( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ]' ' ', , ,
u R
R R R
w R
f
F R R x dx u R f R u R w R f R w R
R
¶= + ⋅ - ⋅¶ò  
Consequently, we obtain 
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With ( ) 10
2
f = , ( ) ( )' 1 0ii x Rx R R q
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Lemma 1. 
For ( )
5
2 e
e
Z
Z
qgsg q g- < < - , there is R  such that  
a. For ,R Rgé éÎ ë ë  we have ( )' 0RB R >  
b. For ,R R qù ùÎ û û  we have ( )' 0RB R <  
and R  is the unique value of the interest rate for which ( )B R  is maximum. 
 
Proof of Lemma 1. 
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Finally, we have to prove that ( )" 0B R < , R" . 
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Thus, as ( )" 0B R <  R" , ( )B R  is concave on ,R g qé ùÎ ë û  and R  is the unique 
maximum of ( )B R . 
Moreover, as ( ) 0B g < , ( ) 0B R >  and ( ) 0B q = , there is ,cR Rgù éÎ û ë  such that 
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The proof of Lemma 1 is completed ■ 
 
 
Lemma 2. 
 
For ,R g qé ùÎ ë û  we have ( )' 0RK R < . 
 
 Proof of Lemma 2. 
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Proof of part a. of Proposition 1. 
In order to prove the existence of a unique maximum for ( ) ( )( )
B R
R
K R
G = , we use 
Darboux's Theorem. 
 
( )RG  is continuous and differentiable on ,cR R qé ùÎ ë û .  
 
According to Lemma 1 and 2 we have: 
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The conditions of Darboux's Theorem are fulfilled and we can conclude that there is a 
unique * ,cR R qù éÎ û ë  such that ( )' * 0RG =  and *R  is a maximum. 
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Proof of proposition 1 is completed  
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Proof of proposition 2. 
 
Proof of part a. 
 
The ex-post value of the bank is given by 
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Moreover, as Zg >  and R g>  we have ( ) ( ) 0R Z Rs g q gé ù- + - >ê úë û  and 0ce <   
 
Proof of part b. 
 
We search for the value of R  that minimises the bank’s probability of default. We 
know that this probability of default decreases with the value of ce . 
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Consequently, there is a unique value, 
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minimises the value of ce . 
Finally, there is a unique value of bank leverage ( ) ( )( )
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min
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R
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=  that minimises the 
bank's probability of default and the relation between the bank's leverage and the bank's 
probability of default is nonlinear ■ 
 
 
Proof of proposition 3. 
 
Part a. 
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R
Z
¶ >¶

 
if 
( )*,
0
e
e
D R Z
Z
¶ >¶ . As ( )
*
*, 1e
R
D R Z q
æ ö÷ç ÷= -ç ÷ç ÷è ø , 
( )*,
0
e
e
D R Z
Z
¶ >¶  if 
*
0
e
R
Z
¶ <¶ . 
We have ( ) ( )( )
*
*
*
,
,
,
e
e
e
B R Z
R Z
K R Z
G =  the maximum value of the RAROC for a given 
expected value of the collateral. Takes the total derivative of ( )*, eR ZG  and equates it 
to zero 
 ( ) ( ) ( )
* *
* *
*
, ,
, 0
e e
e e
e
R Z R Z
d R Z dZ dR
Z R
¶G ¶GG = + =¶ ¶  and 
27 
 
 
( )
( )
*
*
*
*
,
,
e
e
e e
R Z
dR Z
dZ R Z
R
¶G
¶= - ¶G
¶
 
( )*
*
,
0
eR Z
R
¶G =¶  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
*
2
,
0
e
e e
e
B KK BR Z Z Z
Z K
¶ · ¶ ·· - ·¶G ¶ ¶= >¶ ·  as  
( ) ( )* *, 0, , 0e eK R Z B R Z> > , ( )
*,
0
e
e
K R Z
Z
¶ <¶  and  
( ) ( )( )
( )*
1
* 0
i
i ie
x R
B
R dx
Z
f e¶ = >¶ ò . 
And 
*
0
e
dR
dZ
< . 
 
Part b. 
 
According to proposition 1, there is a equilibrium rate of return for the bank if 
2 eZq g> -  or, put differently, for 2 1eZ g q> - <  with 2 1q g> - . 
Thus, for 2 1eZ g q< - <  there is no equilibrium and ( )* 0R = . 
Moreover, as ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( )
1
,
i
e
i i i i
x R
K R Z P dxl a e f e= -ò  and  ( )
1
lim 0
e
e
Z
Zl

= , we have 
 ( )*
1
lim
eZ
R

 +¥ . 
 
Consequently, as ( ) ( )( )
min
min
min
,
,
D R Z
R
K R Z
=  with ( )( )min Z ZR Z
qg gq g q
g q
+ - -= + -  we 
have ( )min0 R< <¥  and we are sure there is 2 ;1ecZ g qé ùÎ -ë û  such that 
( )( ) ( )* minecR Z R=   and ( )( ) ( )* mineR Z R>   for e ecZ Z> . 
 
The proof of proposition 3 is completed ■ 
 
